

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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British Overseas Enterprise to
the Close of the Seventeenth
Century



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The Glorious Revolution and America

RICHARD S. DUNN

In 1689 a dramatic series of uprisings broke out in English America. News that William of Orange had overthrown James II triggered copycat rebellions in many of the colonies, starting with Massachusetts. On 18 April in Boston a band of rebels seized Sir Edmund Andros, the royal Governor of the Dominion of New England, and jailed him with his leading supporters. The Dominion immediately dissolved, and in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Plymouth, Rhode Island, and Connecticut the colonists reinstituted the governments that had been in place when James II ascended the throne in 1685. Agitation quickly spread south. In New York, which had been James's proprietary colony before he became King, insurgents seized control on 31 May from Lieutenant-Governor Francis Nicholson (who then fled to England), and—not wishing to reinstitute their deposed master's proprietary government—set up a Committee of Safety under the leadership of Jacob Leisler. In Maryland there was further rebellion, in this case against the absentee Catholic proprietor, Lord Baltimore. On 1 August an armed band known as the Protestant Associators, led by John Coode, forced the proprietary Governor, William Joseph, to surrender. One week previous to this on the Caribbean island of Antigua the chief planters induced the royal Governor of the Leeward Islands, Sir Nathaniel Johnson—the most outspoken supporter of James II among the American Governors—to resign his office to Christopher Codrington and sail away.¹

Thus the Glorious Revolution spread from England to America. Or did it? Historians disagree violently about the meaning of transatlantic events in 1688–89, and about the larger pattern of Anglo-American relations from 1675 to 1700. To begin with, some celebrate the Revolution of 1688 in England as a principled victory of Protestant parliamentary government over Catholic absolutism, while others dismiss it as a shabby Dutch *coup d'état*.² Students of English colonial policy

¹ For a general overview of the rebellions in Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland, see David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York, 1972). Lovejoy excludes the English West Indies colonies from his discussion. For matters of detail, see the chapters in this volume on the several areas of Colonial North America.

² To point out a few of the historiographical benchmarks, G. M. Trevelyan presents the traditional Whig view in *The English Revolution, 1688–1689* (Oxford, 1938); John Miller argues for James II's

quarrel sharply as to whether the home government was pursuing commercial or Imperial goals, and whether the Crown acted with purposeful vigour or with drifting incompetence in the years leading up to and away from the Revolution.³ Yet most commentators do agree on one point—that however much the colonists supposed they were participating in the Glorious Revolution, they benefited very little by joining in the attack against James II. During the 1690s William and Mary continued most of the deposed King's centralizing and Imperial policies in America, and the Crown and the English merchant community continued to forge a transatlantic business system in which the colonies became satellites of the mother country. The Massachusetts and New York rebels failed to accomplish their principal political and religious objectives, and only the Maryland rebels succeeded in obtaining most of what they wanted. All in all, it seems that the American uprisings were minor skirmishes with superficial relation to the revolution at home.⁴

This chapter argues to the contrary that the Glorious Revolution was a genuinely transatlantic phenomenon, and that the colonial protests against James II's style of government reshaped English policy and American society in enduring ways.⁵ The colonial rebels in 1689 shared, with most Englishmen at home, common objections to James's absolutism and to his Catholicism. They were not aiming for independence as in 1776, and many of them welcomed a closer, more collaborative relationship with the post-revolutionary home government. The colonists' settlement with the Crown in the 1690s, while more restrictive than the bargain struck between Parliament and Crown at home, eradicated the most autocratic features of James II's colonial rule, and also bolstered the ultra-Protestant and anti-

commitment to religious and political principles in *James II: A Study in Kingship* (Hove, 1978); John Childs examines the King's use of a standing army in *The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution* (New York, 1980); Lucille Pinkham presents a hostile account of *William III and the Respectable Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); whereas Robert Beddard emphasizes the positive achievement of William and his Whig supporters in 'The Unexpected Whig Revolution of 1688', in Beddard, ed., *The Revolutions of 1688* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 11–101.

³ Charles McLean Andrews presents the classic case for an emerging commercial Empire in *The Colonial Period of American History*, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1934–38), IV, chaps. 3–6. Stephen Saunders Webb argues for a powerfully centralized militaristic Empire; see his *Lord Churchill's Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered* (New York, 1995). J. M. Sosin maintains to the contrary that late Stuart policy toward America was always crippled by drift, ignorance, and incompetence; see his *English America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1982).

⁴ This is K. G. Davies's view of 'The Revolutions in America', in Beddard, ed., *The Revolutions of 1688*, pp. 246–70.

⁵ Richard R. Johnson, 'The Revolution of 1688–9 in the American Colonies', in Jonathan I. Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 215–40, develops much the same argument as I do except that Johnson virtually ignores developments in the English West Indies.

Catholic character of religious life in English America. Furthermore, James's overthrow initiated a twenty-five-year war with Louis XIV, in which the Crown needed the co-operation of the colonists in order to conduct military campaigns against the French in the West Indies and North America between 1689 and 1713. The Crown's efforts to enlist colonial co-operation helped to consolidate a compromise style of Imperial administration in America that the home government sustained from the 1690s into the 1760s. Thus, the Glorious Revolution was a climactic event in seventeenth-century Anglo-American history. The American participants, in pressing William and Mary to modify Crown colonial policy, articulated local political and social tensions that had been disrupting life in English America throughout the 1670s and 1680s. The revolutionary settlement resolved many of these tensions. It notably broadened the ruling class in Maryland and Massachusetts, and more generally galvanized American society in somewhat the same way as the revolution at home galvanized the English state. And the events of 1688–89 also exposed a fundamental and permanent rift in outlook between the two sections of English America—the mainland colonies in North America and the island colonies in the Caribbean.

Down to the mid-1670s most of the mainland and island colonies had shared two common characteristics: semi-independence from England and narrowly élitist government. In the West Indies as in North America the leading planters had evolved their own institutional patterns and social structure with little external supervision. To be sure, the sugar islands were all Crown colonies, directly managed by the King, whereas the mainland colonies, except Virginia, were all governed privately by proprietors or corporations. But in 1668 and 1670 the Barbados Assembly had petitioned Charles II for a royal charter that would turn this colony into a self-sustaining corporation like Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and in 1675 the Virginia government similarly petitioned for a royal charter confirming the authority of their Assembly and guaranteeing no taxation without consent. The royal Governor of Virginia, Sir William Berkeley, like his counterparts, Modyford in Jamaica and Willoughby in Barbados, was a local magnate with a large estate who acted as spokesman for an inner circle of big planters in his colony. In Jamaica, Sir Thomas Modyford ruled as an independent potentate, disregarding instructions from home and conducting his own foreign policy in which he commissioned buccaneering ships to raid Spanish commerce and sack Spanish settlements. In most of the mainland colonies there was even more autonomy. The chartered proprietors of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Carolina had *carte blanche* to govern in any fashion that they could persuade their colonists to accept. The four New England colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and Rhode Island were virtually independent. There was no

recorded official communication between the Crown and the Massachusetts Bay Company between 1666 and 1674,⁶ and during these years the Puritan colonists openly flouted the English Navigation Laws.

In the mid-1670s several of the American colonies experienced domestic crises that exposed the fault-lines within their narrowly based governments. In New York, the temporary Dutch recapture of the colony in 1673–74 stirred up resentment within the large Dutch population against the Duke of York's restrictive regime, in which the chief offices were all appointive and only the richest merchants and largest landholders were admitted into the leadership cadre. Massachusetts had a far more participatory institutional structure than New York, but the bloody Indian war of 1675–76 put tremendous strain on a system where only a minority of adult males—the Puritan church members—were eligible to vote or to hold office. In Virginia, Bacon's Rebellion of 1676 was precipitated by disaffected colonists who rose up against Berkeley's élitist style of management. Here, as in New York, office-holding was monopolized by the Governor's favourites, and the followers of Nathaniel Bacon—though apparently not Bacon himself—demanded a larger legislative voice and an active share in decision-making. In Maryland, the 'Huy and Crye' rebellion of 1676 was led by Protestant insurgents who had somewhat parallel grievances against Lord Baltimore's autocratic regime, which catered to the chief planters and to the small Catholic minority in this colony. In the Caribbean colonies, where élite government was more firmly established, there were no equivalent protests. The biggest sugar planters enjoyed exclusive control in Barbados during the 1670s, and were becoming increasingly dominant in Jamaica and the Leeward Islands.⁷

Around 1675—just at the time of troubles in Massachusetts, Virginia, and Maryland—the home government embarked on a new policy designed to shatter colonial autonomy by binding every plantation directly to the Crown. In 1673 the English Parliament had legislated the most comprehensive Navigation Act to date, and in 1675 Charles II created a new executive Council, the Lords of Trade and Plantations, to supervise the enforcement of the Navigation Acts in the colonies and to collect more American revenue. William Blathwayt, the first Whitehall bureaucrat with a clear plan for strong royal authority in America, was put in charge of the plantation office. Edward Randolph, prototype of a new professional class of colonial officials, was sent to investigate New England in 1676, and three royal commissioners with 1,000 troops arrived in Virginia in 1677 to settle Bacon's

⁶ See Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England*, 5 vols. in 6 (Boston, 1853–54), IV, pt. 2, and the plantation office's New England entry book for 1661–79, C[olonial] O[ffice] 5/903.

⁷ See Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1972), chaps. 3–5.

Rebellion.⁸ In the royal colonies of Jamaica and Virginia, the King's advisers sought to limit the power of the Legislative Assemblies, which were seen as the chief source of obstruction. New Governors—the Earl of Carlisle for Jamaica, Lord Culpeper for Virginia—were directed to make their respective Assemblies ratify a new body of laws prepared by the Colonial Office, including a perpetual revenue law. All future legislation would be drafted by the Governor and his Council, and all future Assemblies would meet only after receiving permission from the King. Carlisle and Culpeper turned out to be more interested in feathering their own nests than in following the King's orders, and they never imposed the new body of laws. But the Virginia Assembly passed a perpetual revenue law in 1680, and the Jamaica Assembly passed a twenty-year revenue act in 1683.⁹ In both colonies the royal Governor's salary was now secure, and autonomy from England was gone for good.

To manage the Crown Colonies, the home government selected men who were quite different from Berkeley, Modyford, and Willoughby: royal Governors without American estates or American vested interests. Many were army or navy officers with the habit of command, who felt innately superior to the bumpkin provincials they encountered in America. Obtaining their posts through court connections, they were often looking for personal profit. Lord Howard of Effingham, the Governor of Virginia, wrote a revelatory series of letters to his wife in which he explained how he expected to send home £1,500 per annum out of £2,500 in salary and perquisites.¹⁰ Sir Richard Dutton operated on a more spectacular scale in Barbados; between 1680 and 1685 he seems to have extracted some £18,000 in salary and perquisites while paying out only £3,000 in expenses.¹¹ But men such as Dutton and Howard also aggressively challenged the local Assemblies and the local planter élites.

In the proprietary colonies of New York and Maryland there was a parallel trend toward authoritative administration between 1675 and 1685. James, Duke of York, gave a preview of his royal style in his ducal province of New York—the only English colony in America without a representative Assembly. Sir Edmund

⁸ See Stephen Saunders Webb, 'William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer', *William and Mary Quarterly* (hereafter *WMQ*), Third Series, XXV (1968), pp. 3–21; Michael Garibaldi Hall, *Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676–1703* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1960), chap. 2; and Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1957), chap. 7.

⁹ The Crown's battle with the Jamaica Assembly is abundantly documented in CO 138/3, and in the following B[ritish] L[ibrary] volumes: Add. MSS, 25120; Sloane MSS, 2724; Egerton MSS, 2395. The parallel campaign against the Virginia House of Burgesses can be traced in CO 5/1355.

¹⁰ Howard to Lady Howard, 23 Feb., 18 April 1684, Howard of Effingham Papers, II, pp. 15, 22, Library of Congress.

¹¹ When Dutton returned to Barbados from a visit to England, he charged his Lieutenant-Governor with misconduct so as to avoid paying him the salary he owed him, and additionally fined him £11,000. See CO 29/3, pp. 248–49, 295–97; Bodleian Library, Clarendon Papers 88, p. 41.

Andros, who governed for the Duke from 1674 to 1680, was a no-nonsense executive who tried to annex New Jersey and Connecticut, and who levied taxes and customs duties without popular consent. When James found that these tactics did not collect as much revenue as he wanted, he permitted his next Governor, Thomas Dongan, to summon an Assembly in 1683. This legislative body drafted a 'Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges' that was supposed to protect New Yorkers from future taxation without representation.¹² But no further Assemblies were convened in New York during the next five years. In Maryland, the third Lord Baltimore, a Catholic like the Duke of York, had a similar managerial approach. He quarrelled with his Assembly every time it met, and concentrated patronage in a narrow circle of councillors. The Maryland Council was mostly Catholic, and more than half the members were tied by blood or marriage to the proprietary family, which effectively blocked advancement or power-sharing for the Protestant majority in the colony.¹³

The biggest challenge for the Crown was how to deal with the remaining proprietary and corporate colonies that had received extensive royal chartered privileges between 1612 and 1664. During the final decade of Charles's reign the King's advisers sought to curb or annul these colonial charters—in tandem with their remodelling of chartered town corporations in England in the early 1680s.¹⁴ Their chief target was the Massachusetts Bay Company, because the Puritans who governed Massachusetts insisted that the charter they received from Charles I in 1629 gave them the right to manage their own affairs without royal supervision. Randolph catalogued the misdeeds of the Massachusetts Bay Company for the Lords of Trade, and led a strenuous campaign against the Bay charter. The colony government countered with delaying tactics, twice sending agents to England—in 1676 and 1682—who had no authority to negotiate revisions in the charter. Wearied by this stalling, the Crown prosecuted the company by writ of *quo warranto* ('by what right...'). The Massachusetts leaders might have salvaged some of their liberties by compromising, as the Virginia and Jamaica Assemblies had done. But Increase Mather, the leading Puritan clergyman, urged his people not to submit, and they followed his advice. In October 1684 the Massachusetts Bay Company was liquidated and the colonists found themselves under direct royal rule.

Charles II's colonial management was often slipshod. For example, the Bermuda Company was prosecuted by writ of *quo warranto* in 1680, and the Crown took control of Bermuda when the company charter was condemned in 1684. But

¹² Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America*, pp. 114–19.

¹³ Lois Green Carr and David William Jordan, *Maryland's Revolution of Government, 1689–1692* (Ithaca, NY, 1974), pp. 38–40.

¹⁴ See Philip S. Haffenden, 'The Crown and the Colonial Charters', *WMQ*, Third Series, XV (1958), pp. 297–311, 452–66.

the King's advisers had nothing to do with the Bermuda prosecution, which was conducted as a private speculation by a minor courtier named Francis Burghill who wanted to become the first royal Governor. The King had no desire to annex this miniature island colony, which he considered to be more trouble than it was worth, and when he found himself saddled with Bermuda he reappointed the existing Company Governor instead of Burghill.¹⁵ A more conspicuous example of royal carelessness was Charles's grant of a proprietary charter to the radical Quaker activist William Penn in 1681. Again, the King's advisers did not wish to put a Quaker pacifist in control of a potentially valuable and strategically situated colony. But Penn secured the patronage of James, Duke of York, and outmanoeuvred his opponents in the Colonial Office. Penn shared none of Charles's or James's political aims, and in 1682 he publicized a benevolent Frame of Government for his 'holy experiment' in Pennsylvania—just when the Stuarts were trying to clamp down on participatory government throughout America.¹⁶ As it turned out, Charles soon had an opportunity to reconsider his gift. Penn quarrelled with his neighbour, Lord Baltimore, concerning the boundary between Pennsylvania and Maryland, and both proprietors came to London in 1684 to ask the King for help. William Blathwayt gleefully announced to Governor Howard of Virginia that Charles II was preparing a *quo warranto* against Lord Baltimore, and that 'Prince Pen declares himself ready to resign his Principality, the Propriety of Land being reserved to him'. This, observed Blathwayt, 'will make the king great and extend his reall empire in those parts'.¹⁷ But Blathwayt was too optimistic. All royal action against Maryland and Pennsylvania was set aside when Charles II died in February 1685 and his brother James succeeded to the throne.

The new King was a more doctrinaire absolutist than Charles, and he continued the centralizing and aggrandizing practices of 1675–85. But he had never taken close interest in his ducal province of New York, and in 1685–88 he treated the rest of his American domain in much the same offhand manner. The Lords of Trade worked less vigorously than they had under Charles II, and colonial policy decisions were made haphazardly. The King was most likely to intervene whenever he saw a chance of making money. For example, as soon as he heard in 1687 that a wrecked treasure ship had been salvaged off Bermuda, James II whipped off a letter to Governor Robinson ordering him to collect one-half rather than one-tenth of this treasure as the royal share.¹⁸ James left the proprietary governments of

¹⁵ See Richard S. Dunn, 'The Downfall of the Bermuda Company: A Restoration Farce', *WMQ*, Third Series, XX (1963), pp. 499–505.

¹⁶ The founding of Pennsylvania, 1680–84, is fully documented in Mary Maples Dunn and Richard S. Dunn, eds., *The Papers of William Penn*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1981–87), II.

¹⁷ Blathwayt to Howard, 9 Dec. 1684, Blathwayt Papers, XIV, Colonial Williamsburg.

¹⁸ James II to Robinson, 21 Oct. 1687, CO 38/2/128–31.

Pennsylvania and Maryland alone, probably because Penn was actively trying to line up support for him among English Dissenters while Baltimore was a fellow Catholic. But all of the remaining private colonies came under attack. No colonial charter was technically annulled during James's reign, but the Rhode Island Assembly accepted a royal takeover in 1686, the Connecticut General Court in 1687, and the New Jersey proprietors in 1688. The Carolina proprietors were also ready to surrender; one of them announced in 1686, 'I shall be as unwilling to dispute his Majesty's pleasure as any man'.¹⁹ Charter government in America was apparently dissolving.

James II and his advisers evidently wished to consolidate all of the American colonies into three or four viceroalties on the Spanish model. Only one of these was actually established: the Dominion of New England, which incorporated eight previously separate colonies into a single province that extended from the Delaware River to the Canadian border. Sir Edmund Andros was given the Governor-Generalship of this vast territory, which he ruled without a Legislative Assembly. He remodelled the lawcourts, reduced New England's local self-government to one town meeting per year, levied new taxes without consent, and jailed those few colonists who protested openly. Andros also promoted the Church of England, enforced the Navigation Acts, and challenged all existing property titles in order to impose new real-estate taxes.²⁰ James II did not get around to combining his southern mainland colonies into a single viceroyalty, but Governor Howard of Virginia urged him to do so, seeing a chance for better profits if he ruled over an enlarged Chesapeake domain. Howard's management technique was rather similar to Andros's. He legislated and taxed by proclamation when he could not get the House of Burgesses to accept his directives, reduced the power of the county courts, squeezed new profits from fees and real-estate taxes, and kept prisoners without trial.²¹ In the Caribbean, the King in 1686 commissioned the Duke of Albemarle as Governor-General of Jamaica, with a handsome salary and honorific privileges such as the power to confer knighthood.²² Albemarle came to Jamaica in the hope of replenishing his squandered fortune; he had already netted £50,000 by investing £800 in the recovery of a sunken Spanish silver galleon near

¹⁹ William L. Saunders, ed., *Colonial Records of North Carolina*, 10 vols. (Raleigh, NC, 1886–90), I, p. 353.

²⁰ This last policy brought Andros into sharp conflict with those members of his Dominion Council who had invested in speculative land companies. See Theodore B. Lewis, 'Land Speculation and the Dudley Council of 1686', *WMQ*, Third Series, XXXI (1974), pp. 255–72.

²¹ H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Legislative Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, 3 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1918–19), I, pp. 66–74; H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1659/60–1693* (Richmond, Va., 1914), pp. 267–70.

²² Albemarle wanted the King to grant him even greater power, amounting to sovereign authority over Jamaica. The negotiations over his appointment are in CO 138/5/220–335.

Hispaniola, and was hoping to find more buried treasure.²³ The West Indian colonists saw him as an Andros-style viceroy, but once he arrived in Jamaica he reverted to Modyford's style of rule. Quite unlike Andros, who allied himself with the largest merchants and planters in New York and New England, Albemarle joined with the buccaneers and the small planters in Jamaica. He toppled the chief sugar planters from their accustomed Council and judicial seats, and employed an armed gang to secure the election of his own supporters to a new Assembly.

James II's economic policy for the colonies was as recklessly aggrandizing as his administrative policy. In 1685 Parliament granted him a new duty on sugar and tobacco, calculated to produce an additional £100,000 for the royal Treasury. This tax was supposed to be passed on to the English consumer, but in fact it was borne by the American producer; in 1686 the price of sugar in London sank to a record low. The colonists' supply of African slave labourers was monopolized by a London corporation, the Royal African Company, in which the King was chief stockholder and company president. This Company never supplied the West Indian sugar planters with as many slaves as they wanted, and ignored the North American slave market altogether, but complaints against the Company brought no results since the royal Governors in the West Indies were agents of the Company. And in 1687 and 1688 James II was asked to charter a new West India Company which promised further profits to the Crown. This projected company, to be presided over by the Duke of Albemarle, would be funded by a joint stock of £500,000 from London investors, and would take over the entire sugar trade, thus controlling all commerce between the West Indies and England. This scheme fell through, but the chorus of grateful addresses to the King from the English Caribbean Assemblies, thanking him for rescuing them from total destruction, shows how vulnerable the sugar planters now felt they were.²⁴

It is easy to sentimentalize the political changes in English America, 1675–88, by dwelling upon grasping Governors, emasculated Assemblies, and the destruction of chartered liberties. The fact is that many colonists were anxious for closer union with the home government. The pre-1675 style of political and economic autonomy had isolated them from the English business community, and the leading merchants and planters, both mainland and island, were eager to jettison some of their old local independence in exchange for better connections with Whitehall

²³ Estelle Ward, *Christopher Monck, Duke of Albemarle* (London, 1915), pp. 234–70.

²⁴ Information about the projected West India or South American Company can be found in Dalby Thomas, *An Historical Account of the Rise and Growth of the West-India Colonies* (London, 1690); BL, Sloane MSS, 3984, pp. 210–11; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, I, pp. 108–09; CO 29/3/471–73 and T 70/57/25–26. For addresses to James II against the Company, see *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, I, p. 123; CO 29/3/479–81 (Barbados); and CO 155/1/172–83 (Nevis).

officials and London merchants. In Jamaica, the big sugar planters welcomed royal intervention in the 1670s against the buccaneers who, under Governor Modyford's protection, had siphoned off their indentured servants and discouraged slave ships from coming to Jamaica. But during James's reign the big planters in all of the sugar islands became increasingly outraged as they saw their political powers stolen by the new royal Governors and their sugar profits stolen by the King's taxes. Likewise in New England, the most entrepreneurial of the non-Puritan merchants welcomed the annulment of the Massachusetts charter in 1684, and accepted office in Andros's Dominion government in 1686. But these entrepreneurs were quickly affronted by Andros's conquest style of administration, especially when he regulated their overseas trade and blocked their efforts at land speculation. By 1689 they were making common cause with the old unreconstructed Puritan leaders in New England.

There is an instructive parallel between the course of events in England and America between 1685 and 1688. On opposite shores of the Atlantic James II and his Governors ruled in a fashion calculated to alienate most people. The King bypassed Parliament, and his Governors bypassed the colonial Assemblies. The King incited religious hysteria by openly favouring the tiny Catholic minority in England and appointing as many Catholics as he could to high offices, and there was a comparable anti-papist frenzy in Maryland, New York, and several of the other colonies where Catholics were prominent office-holders. Furthermore, James's administration was hollow at the core, both in England and America. The King was a cipher in international politics, unwilling and unable to defend England's strategic interests against France. Despite his zeal for military governance, he lacked the firepower to participate in a major war. In England his standing army was far inferior to the Bourbon and Habsburg armies in Europe, and only five companies of soldiers were stationed throughout his vast holdings in America. A garrison state, perhaps, but not a very effective one.

By 1688 there was a disembodied quality to life in the colonies. In the islands, the leadership ranks were thinned because many of the leading planters were living in England as absentees. The Legislative Assemblies, so vigorous a scant dozen years before, were largely silenced. In New England, although almost everyone was alienated by Andros's policy, no one dared to organize an open protest. Increase Mather, champion of the old Puritan orthodoxy, slipped off to England in 1688 in order to appeal to James II against Andros. Throughout America Protestants became paranoid about the threat, as they saw it, of Catholic conspiracy. Settlers on the New England frontier and in the Chesapeake backcountry supposed that French papists were inciting the Indians to attack them. Jamaicans objected when Governor Albemarle's chief adviser, a Catholic priest named Dr Thomas Churchill, was sent to England as the colony agent. In Barbados Governor Stede supposed

that a Jesuit missionary from Martinique was a French spy, but dared not send him away for fear of vexing the King.²⁵ The Leeward Island colonists were alarmed when their Governor, Sir Nathaniel Johnson, cultivated cordial relations with the French at Martinique.²⁶ Especially in St Kitts—where the indentured servants were mostly Irish Catholic, and the French occupied half the island—fear of popery and of French attack was downright paralysing.

Never before, and probably never since, were such toadying letters and groveling addresses sent to Whitehall from America. Each notable English event—the King's accession, Monmouth's defeat, the Queen's pregnancy—was received with mounting spasms of rapture. And when the fateful news arrived in November 1688 that the Queen had given birth to a son, Governor Howard of Virginia glowed at 'the happy, happy news of the birth of the Prince of Wales'.²⁷ In Maryland Governor William Joseph instructed the Assembly to legislate a perpetual anniversary celebration of the birthday of James's Catholic heir.²⁸ In New York there was feasting, bonfires, and, to quote Edward Randolph, 'nothing but God bless the prince and drinking his health and loud acclamations were heard that night'.²⁹ And in Jamaica Governor Albemarle toasted the Prince so immoderately that he plunged into a fit of jaundice and died.³⁰

News of the revolutionary events at home slowly trickled into the colonies. In December 1688 word reached Boston that William of Orange had invaded England. By January 1689 this information had filtered into the Chesapeake and Caribbean colonies. In February ships landing at Antigua and Philadelphia reported James II's flight to France. But in April the information was still unofficial; no orders had come from the new English government. James II's Governors behaved with the nervousness of men who feared that they were losing power: Andros and Howard both embargoed all shipping in order to hide news from England. In Maryland Governor Joseph ordered the planters to deliver all their guns to the colony arsenal for repairs, and prorogued the April 1689 meeting of the Maryland Assembly. The rumour spread that the papist councillors in Maryland were conspiring with the Indians to kill off all Protestants. In March and April backcountry settlers in Virginia and Maryland were gathering in armed

²⁵ Stede's circumspect accounts of the visiting Jesuit, written in 1688, are in CO 29/3/471–75 and CO 29/4/24–25.

²⁶ Johnson also permitted the Catholics in St Kitts and Montserrat to establish their own churches and clergy, CO 153/3, pp. 316–17, 418–22.

²⁷ Howard to Lord Sunderland, 28 Nov. 1688, Howard of Effingham Papers, I, Library of Congress.

²⁸ CO 5/718/71–76.

²⁹ Robert N. Toppan and A. T. S. Goodrick, eds., *Edward Randolph*, 7 vols. (Boston, 1898–1909), VI, pp. 263–65.

³⁰ Dr Hans Sloane's medical report on the Duke's fatal drinking bout is in BL, Sloane MSS, 3984, pp. 283–84.

bands.³¹ And in Massachusetts Andros reported uneasily: 'There's a general buzzing among the people, great with expectation of their old charter, or they know not what.' Two days later Boston rose in revolt.

The rebellion in Massachusetts and elsewhere in America was bloodless, as in England, because James II's Governors, like their master, offered no resistance. In Boston Andros had little chance to resist, for the revolt of 18 April 1689 was carefully planned and vigorously executed. The whole town suddenly appeared in arms, and militia from neighbouring towns streamed in with alacrity. When some 2,000 militiamen marched against his garrison of fourteen redcoats, Sir Edmund decided to surrender. The rebels kept Andros and his most hated associates in prison until February 1690, and then shipped them back to England.³² In New York, where opposition to the existing regime was much less well organized, Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson handled the crisis very feebly. Instead of taking warning from the Boston revolt, he sat passively amid a rising clamour for the proclamation of William and Mary, and watched the surrounding towns mutiny against him. When the city militia also rioted on 31 May, he surrendered the keys of Fort James to the militia captains. Ten days later he sailed for England.³³

In Maryland Governor Joseph and the proprietary Council were more pugnacious than Nicholson. They learned of William and Mary's accession in April, but refused to proclaim them—probably because, as one of the Catholic councillors put it, they were praying for James II's 'happy restoration without bloodshed'.³⁴ Opposition to the proprietary government gathered force, and in July John Coode, a habitual malcontent, began to raise a rebel army. On 25 July the rebels, who called themselves Protestant Associators, issued a declaration announcing that they were rising in defence of William and Mary and of the Protestant religion. Joseph and his councillors mustered 160 men to defend Lord Baltimore's government, but when an overwhelming force of 700 armed Associators confronted them, the proprietary leaders signed articles of surrender on 1 August without firing a shot. One of the articles banned all Catholics from office in Maryland. The deposed officials were granted safe conduct to their homes, but were not permitted to leave for England nor to send letters, while the Associators

³¹ William Hand Browne and others, eds., *Archives of Maryland*, 72 vols. (Baltimore, 1883–1972), VIII, pp. 56, 67, 70–71; H. R. McIlwaine and others, eds., *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, 6 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1925–66), I, pp. 103–06.

³² Seven accounts of the Boston revolt are printed in Charles M. Andrews, ed., *Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675–1690* (New York, 1915), pp. 170–267. See also Robert Earle Moody and Richard Clive Simmons, eds., *The Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts: Selected Documents, 1689–1692* (Boston, 1988).

³³ Three accounts of the New York revolt are printed in Andrews, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, pp. 320–401. See also J. R. Brodhead, *History of the State of New York*, 2 vols. (New York, 1853–71), II, pp. 557–69.

³⁴ *Archives of Maryland*, VIII, p. 88.

despatched a loyal address to William and Mary.³⁵ Events in neighbouring Virginia suggest that Baltimore's councillors might have forestalled the Associators had they proclaimed the new monarchs in April. The Virginia colonists were also restive in the spring of 1689, and their royal Governor, Lord Howard of Effingham, had departed for England in February, but when the Virginia Council proclaimed William and Mary on 26 April, agitation faded out in this colony.³⁶

In contrast with the mainland colonies, there was no open revolt, though many months of tension, in the English West Indies. In Barbados Governor Stede managed by slow stages to transmute his servile loyalty to James II into an equally unctuous devotion to William III, and by October 1689 the Assembly had gained enough confidence to ask the home government to drop James II's sugar tax.³⁷ In Jamaica Governor Albemarle's death in October 1688 left the colony torn between two factions—the pro-Albemarle small planters and the anti-Albemarle big planters—both bereft of leadership. The Duke's supporters kept control temporarily, ruling by martial law. But in May 1689 it was learned that both James II (in November 1688) and William III (in February 1689) had cancelled all of Albemarle's proceedings, whereupon Albemarle's enemies reoccupied their former posts.³⁸ In the Leeward Islands there was greater alarm. Governor Johnson was a loyal Jacobite who learned 'to my great trouble' in February 1689 that his royal master had fled to France. Of all James II's American Governors, he alone announced in May 1689 that he wished to resign because he could not accept the Revolution. An intercepted letter from the French Governor of Martinique seemed to indicate that Johnson was conspiring to betray his government to the enemy. In May 1689 a band of Irish Catholic servants sacked many of the English plantations on St Kitts, and in July the French planters on the island invaded the English half of St Kitts. Obviously the Leeward Island planters had far better grounds for overthrowing their Governor than the colonists in Massachusetts, New York, or Maryland—yet they were afraid to do anything so drastic. Finally Johnson did resign. On 24 July he commissioned Christopher Codrington as Governor in his place and sailed away to Carolina. One week later the English garrison on St Kitts surrendered to the French.³⁹

In North America several features of the Revolution merit emphasis. In the first place, while the Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland rebels all claimed to be following William III's splendid example, these three uprisings were each

³⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII, pp. 107–10, 154–56.

³⁶ *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, I, pp. 101–02, 106–07.

³⁷ CO 29/4, pp. 103–19, 159–64; CO 31/3, pp. 182–83, 195–97.

³⁸ CO 138/6, pp. 144–65, 210–26; CO 140/4, pp. 261–62, 268, 273–75; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, I, pp. 134–36.

³⁹ CO 152/37, pp. 35, 47, 68–69; CO 153/3/427–31; CO 153/4, pp. 106–10, 119–58; CO 155/2/73.

distinctly different in character. In Massachusetts, where almost everyone was opposed to the Dominion government, the colonists united decisively against Andros on 18 April—but then differed about what course to take after the Dominion was overthrown. The majority wanted to restore the charter government and the Puritan church–state nexus that they had lost in 1684, in effect to revert to the good old days, while a significant minority wanted a more broadly based government that would include non-Puritans as well. In New York, where ethnic, religious, and class cleavages were sharper than in Massachusetts, the colonists never acted in unity. Many New Yorkers, the Dutch in particular, were eager to embrace their new Dutch Protestant King. Some were fiercely anti-Catholic, some wanted more self-government, some resented the inner circle of office-holders who had dominated affairs under James. The members of this ruling élite, including the biggest merchants and landholders in the colony, had prospered during James's regime and were opposed to the revolt from the start. In Maryland the factional division was simpler than in New York. Here the rebel Associators arrayed themselves against the supporters of Lord Baltimore, and invoked anti-Catholicism to rally the Protestant majority to their cause. Significantly, the Associators wanted William and Mary to annul a royal charter and assume direct control of the Maryland government, whereas the Puritans in Massachusetts wanted the new monarchs to restore a royal charter and abandon direct control of the Bay government.

The rebels' methods also differed. The Boston revolt was led, Cotton Mather tells us, by 'some of the principal Gentleman' of the town. Actually, the fifteen men who summoned Andros to surrender were a carefully balanced coalition—five officers of the old Massachusetts chartered government, five of Andros's Dominion councillors, and five hitherto private citizens.⁴⁰ This coalition symbolized New England's united opposition to Andros, but lacked a spokesman to hold things together once the Dominion was toppled. The Principal Gentlemen quickly organized themselves into a Council of Safety, but this provisional government lasted only five weeks. When they summoned a Convention of the Massachusetts towns in May 1689—in imitation of William's Convention at Westminster in January 1689—the majority of towns voted to resurrect the charter government that had been annulled in 1684.⁴¹ However, the Convention elected several prominent non-Puritans as magistrates, and thus preserved bipartisan support for the rebellion.

In New York there was no equivalent to the Principal Gentlemen, but there certainly was a rebel spokesman: Jacob Leisler. In May 1689, as Nicholson's

⁴⁰ Richard S. Dunn, *Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630–1717* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 254–56.

⁴¹ Court Records, VI, pp. 2–36, Massachusetts Archives.

government disintegrated amid seething rumours of popish conspiracy, Leisler was a militia captain in New York City. After Nicholson's departure he established himself by mid-June as the most decisive leader among the insurgents. Leisler has been variously portrayed as a demagogue, a populist, and a Calvinist zealot,⁴² and perhaps he is best seen as combining all of these characteristics. Before 1689 he had been a successful merchant, and had engaged in bitter lawsuits with Nicholas Bayard, a leading member of James II's New York administration. Leisler rose to power by stages, being elected captain of the fort in June, and Commander-in-Chief in August; he finally assumed the title of Lieutenant-Governor in December 1689. He managed to keep power for a year and a half, ruling with the aid of a Council and an Assembly elected in 1690. But his command was always contested, especially in Albany and in eastern Long Island, and he had great difficulty collecting taxes. During 1690 his regime became increasingly dictatorial and desperate, as he freely arrested and imprisoned his critics on charges of sedition and treason. By the close of his stormy rule, New Yorkers had divided themselves into two fiercely partisan factions: the Leislerians and the Anti-Leislerians.⁴³

In Maryland the rebel leader John Coode seems at first glance to have played much the same role as Jacob Leisler. Both men were provocateurs, rather in the style of Nathaniel Bacon in Virginia in 1676, but Coode proved to be a less dominant figure than Leisler or Bacon. He led the initial revolt in July 1689, and took the title of Commander-in-Chief, but after the first few months was no longer in charge. The Maryland Associators pursued a more cautious course than Leisler and his partisans. Having ousted the proprietary government, they kept power until 1692 without exercising much central authority. Starting in August 1689 the Associators' Convention—another imitation of William III's Convention—met twice a year. The members of this body were men of considerable social and economic status but scant political experience, because few of them had enjoyed Lord Baltimore's patronage. They refrained from taking vindictive action when their proprietary opponents defied their administration, and were rewarded in May 1690 when they received a letter from the King requesting them to continue in power temporarily. This gave them the legitimacy they needed. At the local level,

⁴² David William Voorhees, who has examined Leisler's career most fully and carefully, argues that he and his followers were chiefly motivated by radical Calvinism. See his 'The "Fervent Zeale" of Jacob Leisler', *WMQ*, Third Series, LI (1994), pp. 447–72; and "'In Behalf of the true Protestants religion": The Glorious Revolution in New York', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1988.

⁴³ Robert C. Ritchie, *The Duke's Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664–1691* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1977), chap. 9; Thomas J. Archdeacon, *New York City, 1664–1710: Conquest and Change* (Ithaca, NY, 1976), chap. 5; Joyce D. Goodfriend, *Before the Melting Pot: Society and Culture in Colonial New York, 1664–1730* (Princeton, 1992), chaps. 4–5; and Randall Herbert Balmer, *A Perfect Babel of Confusion: Dutch Religion and English Culture in the Middle Colonies* (New York, 1989), chap. 2.

the county courts now met regularly and the magistrates preserved order. Many of the small planters, landless labourers, and servants in Maryland seem to have supported the Associators' rebellion, but they did not sit in the Convention. All surviving evidence indicates that the struggle in this colony was between two propertied groups: those who were aspiring to power versus those who already held power.⁴⁴

The rebel colonies, from Massachusetts to Maryland, made some effort to collaborate. Two Connecticut delegates visited Manhattan in June 1689 to help Leisler proclaim William and Mary, and the New York and Maryland governments began a friendly correspondence. Coode told Leisler how he welcomed 'so near and convenient a friendship, especially since our circumstances are so alike, and the common danger so equally threatening'. But when Leisler asked for 100 Maryland soldiers to guard the New York frontier against French and Indian attack, Coode replied that he could not help because the distance was too great and his own province was too unsettled.⁴⁵ None the less, delegates from Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New York did agree in May 1690 to attempt a three-pronged invasion of French Canada, thus demonstrating to William and Mary the loyalty and value of their revolutionary governments. One column would attack Montreal via Lake Champlain, another would make a diversionary feint into Maine, while the largest force would assault Quebec by sea. Unfortunately, this scheme completely backfired. The naval attack on Quebec was a comic failure. The overland expedition got only one-third of the way to Montreal before it turned back. Leisler was so furious that he rushed up to Albany, arrested General Fitzjohn Winthrop of Connecticut, who had commanded the expedition, and tried to court-martial him. Winthrop managed to escape, but he bore no love for Leisler. 'Never,' he protested, 'did I see such a pitiful beastly fellow.'⁴⁶ Obviously any effective colonial war against French Canada was going to need home supervision.

In the English island colonies the French menace was much more tangible than in North America. Since the 1660s Anglo-French warfare in the Caribbean had been highly destructive. Between 1666 and 1713 St Kitts changed hands seven times, Montserrat and Antigua were sacked twice each, and Jamaica and Nevis once each, with many thousand settlers captured and dispersed, their slaves taken, and their plantations wiped out. The Leeward Islanders, in particular, remembered the last French war of 1666–67, when all four islands had been ransacked. The English planters, being heavily outnumbered by their black slaves, were also wary of slave insurrections; the most recent slave uprisings had occurred in Jamaica in 1685,

⁴⁴ Carr and Jordan, *Maryland's Revolution of Government*, chap. 6.

⁴⁵ Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., *The Documentary History of the State of New-York*, 4 vols. (Albany, NY, 1850–51), II, pp. 42–44, 181–84, 266–69.

⁴⁶ Winthrop Papers, VI, p. 177, Massachusetts Historical Society.

Barbados in 1686, and Antigua in 1687.⁴⁷ Thus the island colonists looked to William and Mary for help in 1689. With Albemarle dead in Jamaica, Johnson decamped from the Leeward Islands, and many of the leading planters absentees in England, supervision and support by the new government was desperately needed.

Between 1689 and 1692 agents from all of the American colonies lobbied furiously at Whitehall—with highly variegated results. They discovered that many of the men who had shaped or conducted Charles II's and James II's colonial affairs were still in place. William Blathwayt continued as the central figure in the Plantation Office. Edward Randolph, arriving in London in 1690 after spending eight months in a Boston jail, was soon sent back to America to inspect the collection of customs duties. Sir Edmund Andros and Francis Nicholson, both deposed in 1689, were likewise reappointed after the Revolution as royal Governors—this time in Virginia and Maryland. The colonial agents discovered too that much of Charles's and James's centralizing policy was also still in place. The new King was far too busy with other matters, particularly the war against Louis XIV in Europe, to spend much time on American colonial policy. Yet William III did have a fairly consistent colonial agenda. He and his ministers insisted that the Navigation Acts be strictly enforced, and that military governors be put in charge of the colonies in order to wage effective war against the French. But the new King, with his Calvinist background, showed some sympathy for the colonists' complaint that James II had tried to Catholicize America (or, in the case of New England, that he had tried to foist the Anglican church upon Protestant Dissenters). And William showed little interest in sustaining James's viceregal system of colonial administration, or his monopolistic economic policy. Fundamentally, the new monarchs accepted the principle that Englishmen in America should enjoy representative self-government as at home, but popular legislature was everywhere to be balanced by royal executive in English America.

In the revolutionary settlement of Maryland, the rebel Associators achieved far greater success than their counterparts in Massachusetts and New York. The King's ministers accepted the rebels' charge that Lord Baltimore had badly misruled his colony, and they suspended the proprietor's chartered powers of government. The Crown appointed a Protestant English soldier, Lionel Copley, as the first royal Governor of Maryland, and appointed a Council made up of Associators. Baltimore protested vigorously but unsuccessfully, though he was permitted to keep proprietary control over the land in the colony and to receive much of the colony revenue. When Copley arrived in Maryland in April 1692 he formed a political partnership with the men who had led the rebellion in 1689, though John Coode

⁴⁷ The Jamaican slave revolt is discussed in CO 138/6, pp. 79, 92; CO 140/4, pp. 84–100, 105–08, 169; and *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, I, pp. 81–83. For Barbados, see CO 31/1/675. For Antigua, see CO 155/1/95–109; see above pp. 232–33.

and several of the other Associator leaders were shoved aside as too fractious. The Anglican church was established, and Catholics and Quakers found themselves barred from public office. But despite religious restrictions the governing cadre was now notably larger than in the proprietary era and much more open to new talent. From the 1690s onward the Maryland Assembly became far more assertive and better organized than it had been, and the tensions and dislocations that had stirred rebellion in this colony in 1676, 1681, and 1689 were largely resolved.⁴⁸

In the revolutionary settlement of Massachusetts, the rebel agents put up a strong effort but were forced to capitulate to the home government's wishes. In 1689 Increase Mather was unable to persuade either King or Parliament to restore the old Bay charter, and in 1690 the Lords of Trade summarily dismissed all charges against Governor Andros. A new royal charter for Massachusetts was hammered out, clause by clause, in strenuous negotiation between Mather and Blathwayt—in which Blathwayt won the most-contested points, but Mather secured significant concessions. In the Massachusetts charter of 1691 the franchise qualification was property-holding rather than church membership; the Governor was appointed by the Crown; the House of Representatives nominated the Council; and the Governor's executive appointments required the consent of Council. While the old Bible commonwealth was gone for good, the new Massachusetts legislature was more powerful than in other royal colonies, and the royal Governor was somewhat weaker. This compromise solution well suited the non-Puritan merchants who had joined the 1689 coalition against the Dominion of New England, and it had the effect, as in Maryland, of expanding the governing class significantly. Elsewhere in New England, Connecticut and Rhode Island were permitted to retain their self-governing charters, though Plymouth Colony was now permanently absorbed into Massachusetts.⁴⁹

In the revolutionary settlement of New York, the rebels fared very poorly. The Lords of Trade quickly agreed that a new royal Governor should be despatched to this colony to replace Leisler's regime, and the King assigned Colonel Henry Sloughter to the task, giving him a Council staffed by Leisler's chief enemies—the exact opposite of the decision for Maryland. When Sloughter reached New York in 1691 Leisler delayed relinquishing his command, and Sloughter retaliated by arresting him and bringing him to trial and execution for treason. The old élite, who had controlled the colony under James II, returned to power in a vengeful mood. But though Leisler was dead, his faction lived on. For twenty years, from 1691 to 1710, the Leislerians kept the memory of their martyred leader alive by

⁴⁸ Carr and Jordan, *Maryland's Revolution of Government*, chaps. 5–6.

⁴⁹ Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675–1715* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1981), chap. 3; Michael G. Hall, *The Last American Puritan: The Life of Increase Mather, 1639–1723* (Middletown, Conn., 1988), chap. 7.

feuding continually with their anti-Leislerian enemies. During these two decades the royal Governors fomented this factional rivalry by allying themselves with one or the other side. Thus, in New York there was no agreed-upon settlement, and the legacy of 1689 was a bitterly partisan political environment that hampered economic development and did nothing to resolve the ethnic and social divisions within the colony.

Ironically, the Caribbean colonists, who had not risen up on behalf of William and Mary in 1689, achieved greater success in the revolutionary settlement than any of the mainland colonists. The absentee sugar planters who lived in England joined forces with the London sugar merchants to lobby at Whitehall and Westminster for their interest. As many as sixty Jamaica merchants and planters, resident in England, could be mustered to sign petitions denouncing Governor Albemarle. Edward Littleton, a Barbados absentee planter, published a London tract in 1689 entitled *The Groans of the Plantations* in which he told the new government that the sugar colonies had been ruinously over-taxed and mismanaged by Charles II and James II. Littleton's argument had great weight. Throughout the 1690s William III's government gave special favour to the West Indian sugar interest. The King supplied much greater military aid to the island colonies than to North America. The Royal African Company, patronized by Charles II and James II, lost its monopoly on the African slave trade, and the volume of slave traffic to the English islands immediately doubled as new traders entered the business. In 1693 the government dropped James II's sugar tax of 1685, while the companion tax on Chesapeake tobacco was made permanent. And the style of government in the islands was significantly altered. Throughout the 1690s Christopher Codrington served as Governor of the Leeward Islands and Sir William Beeston was Governor of Jamaica—both opponents of Stuart centralization in their youth, and both very big sugar planters. In 1690 Codrington gathered a force of 2,500 men, invaded St Kitts, and retook the island from the French in a three-week campaign. Throughout the 1690s the English generally outfought the French in the Caribbean, thanks to naval support and fresh troops from home, a regiment from Barbados, and spirited local leadership. Backed by their absentee colleagues in London, Codrington and Beeston symbolized the return of home rule in the English West Indies.

While the mainland colonists won fewer concessions from William and Mary than the island colonists, 1689 marked a major turning point for them as well. Americans such as Increase Mather who came to England to fight for 'liberties' that they could not secure nevertheless gained self-confidence from their stubborn battles with bureaucrats such as Blathwayt, and they also gained a more cosmopolitan understanding of the realities of Anglo-American life. The Revolution made it obvious that the North American colonists, for better or worse, must

operate within a transatlantic system, with London as the metropolitan core. Ambitious planters and merchants quickly learned their role as junior partners in this system. And American intellectuals quickly found ways to assert in positive fashion their provincial identity. The effort by Mather's son Cotton to proclaim the special Ultra-Protestant meaning of New England Puritan society in his monumental *Magnalia Christi Americana* (1702), and Robert Beverley's more modest effort to describe his secular Chesapeake society in *The History and Present State of Virginia* (1705), show how a new generation of Americans was proudly articulating its provincial culture for English readers 3,000 miles away.

It has already been noted how the revolutions in Massachusetts and Maryland enlarged and energized the leadership cadres within these colonies. The same process was also taking place in Virginia, where no upheaval occurred in 1689. With the expansion of the African slave trade during the 1690s, the most entrepreneurial of the Chesapeake tobacco planters were for the first time buying large numbers of slaves in emulation of the Caribbean sugar planters. Here was the nucleus of a powerful ruling class, far wealthier in land and labour than the Chesapeake gentry had been back in the 1670s, that would dominate politics and society in Virginia and Maryland throughout the eighteenth century. The leading Virginia gentry sat on the Council, which was a seasoned and powerful body in the 1690s, and they more than held their own in dealing with Governors Andros and Nicholson between 1690 and 1705. These two gentlemen had learned their own set of lessons from the débâcle of 1689, and both of them acted less arbitrarily and more constructively in William's service than they had in James's. Yet Andros and Nicholson found that their executive authority was continually challenged by the expansive ambitions of the Virginia planter class.

William Blathwayt and his Plantation Office associates at Whitehall were not satisfied with the compromise character of the settlement made between Crown and colonists in 1689–92, and they kept trying to complete the administrative centralization of the English colonial system. These efforts were largely unsuccessful. In 1696 both King and Parliament did act to tighten colonial policy. Parliament passed a new Navigation Act that established Vice-Admiralty courts in America to enforce commercial regulation, while the King created a new supervisory body, the Board of Trade and Plantations, in substitution for the Lords of Trade. Blathwayt was the most vigorous member of this new Board. For several years he and his colleagues assembled evidence to show that the proprietary and corporate colonies in North America were violating the Navigation Acts and hampering the war against France. But when the Board of Trade tried to get Parliament in 1701–02 to pass a Reunification Bill that would bring all remaining chartered colonies under direct Crown control, the Bill failed. William Penn, who in 1688–89 had almost lost his colony because he sided with James against William, joined with agents from

the other private colonies to defeat this manoeuvre. In effect, the compromise settlement of 1689–92 remained in place until the 1760s.⁵⁰

Perhaps the most fundamental result of the Glorious Revolution in America was the emergence of two varieties of colonial relationship, a West Indian kind and a North American kind. The West Indian relationship was tailored to the requirements of the big sugar planters. These people, whose control over island politics and society had been severely challenged between 1675 and 1688, were once again in full charge of their local governments after 1689 even though many of them now lived in England. And they knew that they needed a lot of help from the Crown in order to sustain their prosperity. The sugar planters asked William III for reduced Crown taxes, expanded slave imports, better military support, and full protection against foreign sugar competition. The revolutionary settlement gave them these things, crystallizing their dependent colonial status. As for the North American colonists, they wanted a looser relationship with the Crown, with less political and economic dependency. Though they failed to gain as much leeway as they wanted in 1689–92, they did escape from the stifling restrictions imposed by Charles II and James II, and the revolutionary settlement effectually broadened their local self-government and strengthened their local self-determination. In the early eighteenth century the mainland colonists demonstrated that their sector of the Empire was considerably more dynamic than the West Indian sector. They doubled their population every twenty years; they started expanding into the interior of the continent; they attracted new migrants who made their society more heterogeneous in ethnicity and more pluralistic in religion; their politics became more participatory and their economy more diversified—with widening opportunities for both élite and middling entrepreneurs. None of these creative developments could have happened had James II and his heirs remained in control. Which is why the colonial protests of 1689 matter, and why the Glorious Revolution reshaped English policy and American society in enduring ways.

⁵⁰ Ian K. Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696–1720* (New York, 1968).

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